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Introduction
Pari Passu: Nine letters arranged into four syllables constituting two little Latin words that translate roughly as "on equal footing"; Two little words that may have a giant e¤ect on international capital markets, for good or for ill. For depending on whom one believes, if the interpretation of the pari passu clause in sovereign bond contracts by a judge in the Southern District of New York 1 is allowed to stand, these words will wreak havoc in the market for sovereign debt-by causing Argentina to default 2 , hindering future sovereign debt restructuring operations 3 , and leading sovereign bond issuers to abandon the New York markets 4 -or else act as its savior-by strengthening creditor rights and allowing for less risky sovereign borrowing at lower interest rates.
5
At issue is both the interpretation of the clause-what it means to place creditors "on equal footing"-and its implications-particularly the application of injunctive relief to third parties. Viewed in this context, the contribution of Chabot and Gulati 6 is to further our understanding of the meaning of the pari passu clause. They exhibit the …rst known bond to use language similar in meaning to pari passu: holders of the Mexican Black Eagle bonds, issued in 1843, were to be treated with a "just equality". Moreover, in documenting the context for the issue of this bond, they show that the clause was introduced in response to a debt restructuring that treated holders of identical claims di¤erently based on their country of residence. The implication is that the language was intended to ensure that holders of identical claims would be treated identically.
1 NML Capital Ltd. et al. v In these brief comments, we take a helicopter tour of the history of notions of "equality"
and "justice" in the division of property and show that these concerns have existed for millennia. We argue that the issue at stake is not so much the treatment of holders of identical claims-it is now customary to treat them identically-but whether the holders of di¤erent claims should be treated di¤erently. We show that there is a customary "principle of di¤erentiation" that allows creditors with claims that di¤er in speci…c ways to be treated preferentially. One of these speci…c di¤erences concerns debts that have been reduced in value during a previous debt restructuring or default, and based on this principle we conclude that the New York court has, if not completely misinterpreted the meaning of the pari passu clause, then at least misapplied it. In other words, the equality of treatment of both the unrestructured and restructured creditors of Argentina that the New York Courts are determined to enforce amounts to an unjust equality.
2 Justice, Equity, and Equality In The Division of Property From The Talmud to Today
Credit market participants widely recognize the importance of concerns for justice, equality and equity in sovereign debt restructuring as re ‡ected in the social norm of "intercreditor equity" 7 . Indeed, modern sovereign bond and syndicated loan contracts routinely include a number of clauses, in addition to pari passu, designed to ensure that inter-creditor equity is preserved. In bonds, these include negative pledge clauses to ensure a debtor will not subsequently pledge its assets to future creditors 8 , mandatory prepayment clauses requiring pro rata payments to all lenders in the event of a prepayment to any lender 9 , cross-default clauses allowing any lender to declare a loan in default should the debtor default on any other loan and so prevent early defaulting loans from receiving better terms 10 , and , in the case of syndicated sovereign loans, sharing clauses that explicitly ensured pro-rated payments in the 7 The Republic of Argentina, Reply Brief of Defendent-Appellant, NML Capital Ltd., Aurelius Capital Master, Ltd., -v. -The Republic of Argentina, at 2-3.
8 Lee C. Buchheit, Negative Pledge Clauses: The Games People Play, International Financial Law Review, July 1990, at 10. 9 Gulati & Scott, supra note 1, at 76-7. 10 Ibid, at 26 event of a default.
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As documented by Chabot and Gulati, these concerns were very much active in the early Nineteenth Century as well. Santa Anna's decree of 11th May 1843 stated that it aimed to "establish a just equality amongst the creditors, as much as regards the rate of interest as the order of payment"(emphasis added). Moreover, the decree refers to an "equitable . . . distribution"of funds. Although not appearing as a contract provision in the "Black Eagle" bonds of 1843, similar language did appear in the pre-amble of these bonds.
But what does "just equality"mean in the context of a sovereign debt restructuring?
What does "inter-creditor equity" mean? For that matter, what does it mean to promise to place creditors "on equal footing"? Does "equality" mean that all creditors should be paid the same absolute dollar (or Euro or peso etc.) amount regardless of the size and form of their claim? Or does it mean that they should receive a payment that represents an equal proportion of their claim? And if it is to be an equal proportion, what should it be proportional to? Should it be proportional to the face value of the debt? Or to the present value calculated using some discount rate? The market values prior to the default being announced? Or does "just equality" recognize that there should some explicit di¤erences in treatment allowed in order to account for di¤erences in the underlying forms of a sovereign's debt?
If all creditor claims are identical, both in size and in form, all of these alternatives de…nitions of "just equality" are identical. But creditor claims are rarely identical, di¤ering in both size (the value of the claim) and form (the currency of issue, maturity, security, treatment in a previous debt restructuring, and so on).
Even in the simplest case, where the only di¤erence is in the size of each creditor's claim, disagreements as to how to distribute shares of a property amongst rival claimants have been going on for, quite literally, millennia. Perhaps the best documented examples come from the Babylonian Talmud, written (in both Hebrew and Aramaic) between the 3rd and 5th Centuries of the Common Era. The Talmud contains several examples of the disposition of rival claims of di¤erent sizes to a common property. 12 In some cases, the Talmud speci…es that all creditors should receive an equal absolute amount independent of the size of their claim. In others, the creditors were to receive a payment that was proportional to the size of their claim. In still other cases, the payments are neither equal in absolute terms, or in proportion. Whether these di¤erences re ‡ect special circumstances applying to each claim that are not made explicit in the Talmud, 13 or re ‡ect a sophisticated game-theoretic mechanism for discriminating between claims, 14 they illustrate the di¢ culties associated with …nding "just"settlements.
By contrast, in the context of sovereign debt restructuring there appears to be widespread agreement on how to deal with claims that are similar in form but di¤erent in size:
each creditor should receive an amount that is an equal proportional of their total claim. the spirit of (what they call the "concept"of) the pari passu clause. This argument is persuasive. The term "just equality"was introduced in response to protests against discriminatory treatment that explicitly used the language "equal footing", and hence was likely viewed as synonymous by the bondholders at the time. 25 Moreover, the …rst known pari passu clause in a sovereign bond was introduced under very similar circumstances to the Black Eagle bonds.
In the same way that the just equality clause was introduced in response to past discrimination between holders of identical claims on the basis of their nationality, the …rst known use of an explicit pari passu clause was by Bolivia in 1872, a time in which concerns about discrimination between bondholders of di¤erent nationalities were also high following the col- By contrast, the Republic of Argentina's o¤er to give NML the same settlement terms as it agreed with the restructured creditors satis…es both an ex ante "principle of equality" (as holders of identical claims ex ante are being given the same treatment) and an ex post "principle of di¤erentiation" in that the previously restructured creditors are receiving the same amounts in absolute terms as NML, but are being awarded a higher (indeed, full) proportion of their ex post claims.
Concluding Thoughts
One response to the surprising interpretation of the pari passu clause o¤ered by the New York Court is to advocate that sovereigns delete the clause from their sovereign bond contracts. However, unless the clause is replaced with a similar clause guaranteeing "just equality", this is almost certainly a terrible idea. This is because there are at least two reasons to think that concerns for inter-creditor equity will only become increasingly important in the years ahead.
The …rst reason is the increasingly widespread adoption of aggregation clauses in sovereign bond contracts. First introduced by Uruguay, 27 aggregation clauses allow a supermajority of bondholders drawn from a set of potentially very di¤erent bonds to impose a restructuring on all bonds within the set. The Eurogroup has committed to introduce aggregation clauses into all Euro area bonds starting in 2013, 28 which might lead to their more widespread adoption by other countries. And although these clauses often also require a super-majority of the holders of each bond to approve a restructuring, Greece used legislation to retroactively insert an aggregation clause into its own domestic law bonds that did not include this protection for each bond (nor did these bonds include a pari passu clause). As a consequence, the possibility that a supermajority of bondholders might impose an inequitable restructuring on a minority of bondholders has become more likely.
The second reason is that there is already a precedent for the use of aggregation clauses to impose a highly discriminatory restructuring. The recent Greek debt restructuring, which made use of aggregation clauses, involved a large number of bonds with maturities ranging from the very short term up to 45 years. 29 The bonds were mostly similar in form, except for di¤erences in their maturity. Despite their similarity, the degree of discrimination across these bonds was extreme: the private holders of some short term bonds had their value reduced by almost 90 percent, while the private holders of some long-dated debts had their claims reduced in value by less than 20 percent. 30 And bonds held by some creditors, the European Central Bank, European national central banks, and the European Investment Bank, were not reduced in value at all despite being identical to bonds held by private creditors. 31 This degree of discrimination appears to be unprecedented.
32
In summary, the evidence shows that concerns for inter-creditor equity or the "just equality"of treatment of creditors have been around for millennia and, in the case of sovereign borrowing, at least for centuries. Recent developments in sovereign debt markets suggest that these concerns may intensify in the future, emphasizing the importance of clarifying the meaning of the pari passu clause. In these notes, we have argued that this clause is only intended to ensure the identical treatment of creditors holding identical claims; when creditor claims di¤er, as they do in the Argentina case, creditors should be treated di¤erently, and custom dictates that the restructured creditors should be treated preferentially. After all, had the drafters of the pari passu clause wanted to ensure ratable payments across all creditor claims, they could have substituted two other little Latin words-pro rata-for pari passu. 30 ibid at 21. 31 Although loans that originated from international organizations are typically treated preferentially, there is no known precedent for loans that originated from private sector creditors and that were subsequently acquired on secondary markets by international institutions to receive preferential treatment. 32 Zettelmeyer et al, supra note 29, n.27 at 21-2. 33 Indeed, some modern bonds speci…cally require ratable payment. See Tolek Petch "NML v. Argentina in an English Legal Setting" in this volume at 6.
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